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GARNISHMENT IN OHIO: WHERE IS IT NOW?
On June 5, 1970, the 108th General Assembly of the State of Ohio
passed Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 85.1 This Act revises the
garnishment procedure, increases the exemptions for personal earnings
and certain items of personal property, prescribes that garnishment is to
be granted only after judgment, modifies the venue in actions on cogno-
vit notes and specifies a warning which must be included in all cog-
novit notes. The main thrust of this Act, however, is aimed at the
garnishment of personal earnings. Accordingly, this note examines the
specific topic of post-judgment garnishment' of personal earnings in Ohio.
The necessity of this examination arises from the incompatibility of
this Act with the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act.3  The res-
olution of a substantial number of the points of this discord occurred in
Hod gson v. Cleveland Municipal Court.4
I. INTRODUCTION
Simply stated, garnishment is strictly a statutory proceeding, ancillary
to a main action, by which a creditor seeks satisfaction of an indebted-
ness out of an obligation owing to a debtor from a third person.5 The
person instituting the proceeding is referred to as the creditor or plain-
tiff; the person indebted to the creditor is called the debtor or defen-
dant; and the person holding the debtor's property is termed the gar-
nishee.
Confusion often results in Ohio law because the area delineated by
the words "attachment," "execution" and "garnishment" is permeated
with misunderstanding and improper use of terms and definitions in
both the Ohio statutes and case law. Further, the Ohio statutes dealing
with attachment and aid in execution are not admirably arranged, and
they use the term garnishment loosely, disregarding its proper legal
meaning.6 "The term attach implies seizure. . . . 'The only object of
l Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 85 [hereinafter referred to as the Act) became ef-
fective September 16, 1970.
2 For discussion of garnishment and its negative social and economic effects see generally
Brunn, Wage Garnishment in Californiax. A Study and Recommendations, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
1214 (1965); Patterson, Forward: Wage Garnishment-An Extraordinary Remedy Run Amuck,
43 WASH. L. REV. 735 (1968); Satter, Argument for the Abolition of Wage Attachment, 52
ILL. B. J. 1026 (1964); Comment, Garnishment of Wages in Pennsylvania: Its History and
Rationale, 70 DIcr. L. REV. 199 (1966); Comment, Wage Garnishment-The Cotemporary
Shylock's Pound of Flesh, 40 Miss. L. J. 151 (1968); Comment, Wage Garnishment it; Wash-
ington--An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. REV. 743 (1968); Comment, Wage Garnishment as
a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 759 (1967).
a 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t (1970).
4 326 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio 1971) [hereinafter referred to as Hodgson-Cleveland).
5 Union Properties, Inc. v. Patterson, 143 Ohio St. 192, 54 N.E. 2d 668 (1944).
See 5 OIo JuR. 2d Attachments §§ 2,3,4 (1954).
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attachment is to take out of the defendant's possession, and to transfer
into the custody of the law, acting through its legal officer .... ' "'
"The word garnishment.. . mean[s) to take warning or to beware. The
meaning of the word as seen in the law term garnishee is, that a person
who owes or holds money belonging to another is warned by order of
court not to pay it to his immediate creditor, but to a third person
who has obtained or may obtain final judgment against that creditor."'
The distinction between the two terms is that in an attachment proceed-
ing the property of the debtor is taken into legal custody pending judg-
ment in the action, while in a garnishment proceeding the property is
left in the possession of the garnishee.9 The garnishment process is
used most frequently today to satisfy an indebtedness out of an employee-
debtor's unpaid earnings held by the employer.10  The Act's main thrust
is directed at this use of the garnishment process.
The impetus behind the Act was the passage by Congress of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA). 11 Title II112 of the CCPA
imposes certain restrictions on the garnishment process. These federal re-
strictions13 apply to state garnishment laws which do not establish re-
strictions on garnishment substantially similar to or more restrictive than
those provided by Title III of the CCPA. Since the former Ohio gar-
nishment statutes did not meet the standards of the CCPA the Ohio leg-
islature was faced with either accepting the federal restriction as the
applicable law or revising the Ohio law. Prior to the passage of the Act,
"Buckeye Pipe Line Co. v. Fee, 62 Ohio St. 543, 557, 57 N.E. 446 (1900) (citation omit-
ted).
8 Kirby v. Kerr Turbine Co., 18 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 425, 427 (1916).
0 While Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 85 is a revision, and revision implies correc-
tion and improvement, the bill was written to fit into the existing Ohio Revised Code structure
with the result that misunderstanding and improper use of terms and definitions still exist.
An example of this may be found in OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1911.332 (Page Supp. 1970)
of the Act describing what forms are issued by the court to the employer. In the first part of
§ 1911.332, the legislature speaks of issuing to an employer (a) three copies of "the order of
attachment," (b) a one dollar garnishee's fee, and (c) "a written notice that the garnishee an-
swer." The third paragraph of § 1911.332 states that 'The order of attachment and notice to
appear shall be in substantially the following form and three copies shall be served upon the
garnishee[.]" The suggested from is then entitled "Order and Notice of Garnishment and
Answer of Employer." Within this one section there is no consistency in the use of language.
The text of § 1911.332 speaks of an "order of attachment," while the form is entitled an
"Order and Notice of Garnishment and Answer of Employer." The first paragraph indicates
three items are to be issued to an employer, but the third paragraph indicates that items (a) and
(c) listed above should be combined into one item and together called a different name than
they were called in the first paragraph--and then the title of the example form suggests yet a
third name!
10This Act specifically limits garnishment to a post-judgment process so garnishment is
properly termed a proceeding in aid of execution.
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the CCPAJ.
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1970), enacted May 29, 1968 but which did not become ef-
fective until July 1, 1970.
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1674 (1970).
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Ohio law permitted prejudgment garnishment.14  Consequently an ad-
ditional factor dictating change in Ohio law came from the holding of
the United States Supreme Court in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.
that "... absent notice and a prior hearing .. .prejudgment garnishment
. . .violates the fundamental principles of due process."',;
The General Assembly's response to the CCPA and Sniadach was
the passage of Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 85. This Act at-
tempted to place the restrictions on garnishment necessary to bring the
Ohio law in line with the CCPA, and to specifically limit garnishment to
post-judgment situations in compliance with Sniadach. Subsequent events
have frustrated this legislative attempt.'
Broadly stated, the basic cause for the frustration of Ohio's attempt to
escape the imposition of the restrictive garnishment provisions of the
CCPA lies in the fact that Congress chose an employee's weekly earn-
ings as the unit for computing the amount to be garnished from his
paycheck, while the Ohio legislature chose the employee's monthly earn-
ings as the unit. To comprehend why this difference proved fatal to the
Ohio Act, it is helpful to study the procedural operation of the Act,
compare that operation to the CCPA and to examine Judge William
'4 62 Ohio Laws 10 (1865).
35 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969). Because Ohio remains a cognovit note state, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2323.13 (Page Supp. 1970), how much actual change Sniadach caused in Ohio
law is questionable in those instances where a judgment is rendered on a cognovit note. A
defendant who has signed a cognovit note may have a judgment rendered against him without
notice and prior hearing. In states sanctioning cognovit judgments a constitutional problem
remains: Does limiting garnishment to only post-judgment situations have any real effect where
a garnishment is commenced pursuant to a judgment on a cognovit note? Is a due process
issue raised by the foregoing question? This question may soon be answered by the United
States Supreme Court in Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), probable j/1-
risdiction noted, 401 U.S. 991 (1971).
'
6Ohio's attempt to supersede the provisions of the CCPA began through the administra-
tive process provided for in the federal act, 15 U.S.C. § 1675 (1970):
The Secretary of Labor may by regulation exempt from the provisions of section
1673(a) of this title garnishments issued under the laws of any State if he determines
that the laws of that State provide restrictions on garnishment which are substan-
tially similar to those provided in section 1673(a) of this title.
Pursuant to this authority the Secretary issued 29 C.F.R. § 870.52 (1971). In accordance with
this regulation, Ohio applied on July 15, 1970, for exemption of the Ohio garnishment laws
from the mandates of the CCPA. While the Ohio application was pending, the Cleveland
Municipal Court began implementing certain provisions of the new Ohio garnishment laws by
using forms substantially identical to those prescribed in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1911.332
(Page Supp. 1970). This action prompted the Secretary of Labor to seek a temporary injunc-
tion in federal district court against such implementation. The district court invited the Ohio
Attorney General to participate and on September 25, 1970, the district court issued an interloc-
utory order and supporting memorandum granting the temporary injunction. James D. Hodg-
son, Secretary of Labor v. Cleveland Municipal Court, Civil Action No. C. 70-908 (N.D.
Ohio September 25, 1970). On November 24, 1970 the Secretary of Labor denied Ohio's
application for exemption. The last step in the frustration of the Ohio General Assembly's
effort to bring Ohio law in line with the CCPA was Hogdson v. Cleveland Municipal Court,
326 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
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K. Thomas' construction of the Ohio Act and the CCPA in Hogdson v.
Cleveland Municipal Court.'7
II. THE LEGISLATIVE DESIGN OF THE OHIO ACT
Complying with Sniadach, Ohio's new garnishment Act permits only
post-judgment garnishment. 8 Further, the Act provides that a creditor
cannot commence an action in garnishment until he has formally con-
fronted his debtor with the fact that a court has declared him in debt
to the creditor for a specific amount. The Act dictates that this con-
frontation shall be in the form of a "Notice of Court Action to Collect
Debt."'" This notice informs the debtor that he can avoid an action in
garnishment by exercising within at least 15 days any one of three
methods: (a) paying the debt he owes, (b) applying to his local munic-
ipal or county court for a trustee relationship which will establish an
arrangement for the payment of his debt out of his earnings,20 or (c) by
completing a form, which is attached to the notice, entitled "Payment
To Avoid Garnishment" and submitting to the creditor an amount de-
termined by a formula contained therein.2 After making this formal
17 326 P. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio 1971).18 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1911.33, 2715.01, 2715.02, 2715.11 (Page Supp. 1970).
Section 2715.01 states in part: "An attachment against the personal earnings of a defendant,
through an action in garnishment, may be granted after a judgment has been obtained by the
plaintiff" (emphasis supplied). Sections 1911.33 and 2715.11 are similar in intent with
the exception that the former refers to municipal court procedure while the latter refers to the
court of common pleas procedure. Subsection (A)(4) of each section states that one of the
prerequisites of commencing a garnishment action is "[t]hat the demand in writing has been
made as required by section 2715.02 .. " Reference to the demand in writing of section
2715.02 demonstrates the demand cannot be made until a judgment has been secured. Addi-
tionally, the last sentence of section 2715.02 makes it explicitly clear: "The demand shall be
made after judgment is obtained .. " Therefore, a reading of §§ 1911.33 and 2715.11 to-
gether with § 2715.02 indicates that the words "may be" carries the same effect as "shall be."
10 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2715.02 (Page Supp. 1970). The written demand of this sec-
tion may be made in a proceeding before a court of common pleas OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2715.11 (Page Supp. 1970), or a county court OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1911.33 (Page
Supp. 1970).
2 0 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.70 (Page Supp. 1970).
21 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2715.02 (Page Supp. 1970). This form is set out here.
PAYMENT TO AVOID GARNISHMENT
T o : --------------------------------------- ----------------------
(Name of Creditor)
(Address of Creditor)
To avoid the garnishment of which you have given me notice I enclose$--------- to apply towards my indebtedness to you. The amount of the pay-
ment was computed as follows:
1. Total amount of indebtedness demanded: (1) $
2. Enter the amount of your earnings after deductions
required by law, for the previous monthly pay period (if
not employed a full month, enter a full month's pay at
your present pay rate) : (2) $ ------------
3. Enter the lesser of - (a) an amount equal to
1971]
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demand, a proceeding in garnishment may be commenced in a county
court22 or a court of common pleas.2 3  In either court the steps which
must be followed are identical.
These steps begin with the filing of an affidavit by the creditor con-
forming with § 1911.33 or the identical § 2715.11.24  Then the creditor
must provide proof to the court that the "Notice of Court Action to
Collect Debt" was sent to the debtor,25 and deposit with the court one
dollar as the garnishee's fee 6  When the court is satisfied that the cred-
itor has properly performed his task, it issues to the employer ". . . three
copies of the order of attachment, together with the garnishee's fee ...
and a written notice that the garnishee answer . .. "27 The Act pre-
17.5% of the amount on line 2; or (b) the amount by
which the amount on line 2 exceeds $ ----------- (175
times the current federal minimum hourly wage): (3) $
4. Enter the lesser of the amounts on lines 1 and 3.
Send this amount to the creditor along with this form after
you have signed it: (4) $--------
I certify that the statements contained above are true to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
(Signature of Debtor)
(Print name and address of debtor)
I certify that the amount shown on line 2 is a true statement of the debtor's
earnings.
(Print Name of Employer)
(Signature of Employer or Agent)
22 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1911.33 (Page Supp. 1970). While this section does not
specifically state that municipal courts have jurisdiction over garnishment proceedings, OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 1901.18 (Page 1968) provides municipal courts with jurisdiction.
23 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.11 (Page Supp. 1970).
2 4 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1911.33, 2715.11 (Page Supp. 1970). With the exception
of the name of the court, these sections are substantively identical.
(A) An action in garnishment may be commenced in a county court [court of
common pleas) by the filing of an oath in writing made by the plaintiff, his agent,
or attorney setting forth:
(1) The name of the defendant;
(2) That affiant has good reason to believe that the person, partnership, or corpo-
ration named in the affidavit as the garnishee has property of the defendant not ex-
empt under section 2329.62 or 2329.66 of the Revised Code;
(3) A description of that property;
(4) That the demand in writing has been made as required by section 2715.02
of the Revised Code;
(5) That the payment demanded in the notice required by section 2715.02 of
the Revised Code has not been made, nor has a sufficient portion been made to pre-
vent the garnishment of personal earnings in the manner described in section 2715.02
of the Revised Code;
(6) That affiant has no knowledge of any application by defendant for the ap-
pointment of a trustee so as to preclude the garnishment of defendanes personal earn-
ings.
25 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1911.331, 2715.111 (Page Supp. 1970).
26OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1911.331, 2715.111 (Page Supp. 1970).
27 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1911.332 (Page Supp. 1970). See also OmHO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2715.112 (Page Supp. 1970).
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scribes what form "the order of attachment and notice to appear" should
take, and offers an example entitled "Order and Notice of Garnish-
ment and Answer of Employer." 28
The receipt of this form by the employer marks the beginning of an
important step in the Ohio Act, a step which will determine how much
of a debtor's earnings an employer is required to pay into court. This
form provides a statutory formula 29 for implementing the personal earn-
ing's exemption standards provided in §§ 2329.62 3 and 2329.66. 1 The
standards of these two sections are identical. 2 The final limiting provision
2 8 OiO REv. CODE ANN. § 1911.332 (Page Supp. 1970).2 9 Id. This form is set out below.
Section B. Answer of Employer (Garnishee)
(Answ
Now Comes
Herein who says:
1. Defendant is in my/our employ.
It answer is "No," give date of last employment.
'er all Pertinent Questions)
----------- the employer
Yes No
(1) - N
Yes No
2. Has defendant been garnished within the 30 days pre-
ceding the date of service of this form?
If answer is "Yes," give prior court and case number; then omit
questions 3, 4, 5, and 6; sign the form and return it to the court. (2) -
Court Case No.
3. Amount I/we owe defendant for services rendered be-
fore this form was received. (3) $..........
4. Enter earnings of the defendant after deductions re-
quired by law, for the previous monthly pay period (if the de-
fendant has not been employed a full month, enter the amount
of monthly pay at present pay rate) : (4) $----------
5. Enter the lesser of (a) an amount equal to 17.5% of
the amount of line 4; or (b) the amount by which the amount
on line 4 exceeds $ ----------- (175 times the current fed-
eral minimum hourly wage): (5) $
6. Enter the smallest of the amount entered on line 3; or
the amount entered on line 5; or the amount on line C of sec-
tion A of this form. Pay this amount into court when return-
ing this form: (6) $
I certify that the statements above are true.
(Print name of employer)
(Print name and title of
person who completed form)
Signed--------------
(Signature of person completing form)
Dated this --------- day of ------------- , 19_---
ao OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.62 (Page Supp. 1970).
31 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66 (Page Supp. 1970).
32 The language in both of these sections reads:
(1) One hundred seventy-five times the minimum hourly wage in effect at the
time the earnings are payable, as prescribed by the "Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938," 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. 206(a) (1), and any amendments or additions
thereto or reenactments thereof;
(2) Eighty-two and one-half per cent of the debtor's disposable earnings payable
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of the Ohio Act permits only one garnishment in any 30-day period."
After setting forth both the substantive and procedural aspects of
Ohio's garnishment laws in an attempt to escape the restrictive provisions
of the CCPA, the Ohio legislature sought to insure the validity of Ohio
law under federal standards by the insertion of a construction clause in
the Act.
Title III of the "Consumer Credit Protection Act," 82 Stat. 146
(1968), 15 U.S.C. 1671, provides for restrictions on garnishment of per-
sonal earnings to become effective July 1, 1970, to supersede the laws of
any state which do not provide debtors with protection at least equal to
the minimum protection provided in that federal act. It is the intention
of the general assembly to avoid the inevitable confusion which will result
if any part of the federal act is superimposed on Ohio law, by enacting
garnishment laws which provide protection to debtors which equals or
exceeds that contained in the federal law, and all the laws of this state
affecting such garnishments shall be construed so as to effect this purpose.3 4
III. DIFFERING ASPECTS OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS
A literal application of the Ohio exemption formula in Section B of
the form entitled "Order and Notice of Garnishment and Answers of
Employer" 5 provides that only the lesser of either (1) 171/ percent of
the earnings for the previous monthly pay period 6 or (2) the amount
by which earnings exceed 175 times the current federal minimum
hourly wage" be withheld by the garnishee. The federal counterpart
from a garnishee, or, when the exemption is claimed by the debtor pursuant to a
proceeding in bankruptcy, eighty-two and one-half per cent of the debtor's cross earn-
ings for the thirty-day period ending on the tenth day prior to filing the petition in
bankruptcy.
33 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1911.33(B), 2715.11(B) (Page Supp. 1970).
34 OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.621 (Page Supp. 1970).
At this point it should be noted what salutary features the Ohio Act contains. The Act
provides the debtor with 15 days advance notice of the pending garnishment action and provides
three means for the employee to avoid garnishment, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1911.33, 2715.11
(Page Supp. 1971). It also limits garnishment actions to a maximum of 12 in any one year
period, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1911.38(B) (Page Supp. 1971), compared to a possible 52
under the CCPA. Arguably, at least, the constant and continual garnishment of a debtor's weekly
pay checks lends itself to unwarranted extensions of credit and the danger of subsequent job loss
by the exasperated employer. This harassment value alone, in the hands of an unscrupulous
creditor can be a dangerous bludgeon over the employee.
35 OHIo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 1911.332 (Page Supp. 1970). See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1911.331,2715.111 (Page Supp. 1970).
36 Because of the parenthetical language found in line (4) of Section B of the form titled
"Order and Notice of Garnishment and Answer of Employer," see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
1911.331, 2715.111 (Page Supp. 1970), there was a problem in determining whether actual
monthly earnings or the monthly pay rate, whether earned or not, was to be used. The par-
enthetical language in line 4 seems to suggest that an employee who works only one week of a
month and received only $100.00, may be garnished oa the fictitious basis that he worked the
full month. However, the court ". . . determined and declared that line 4 ... requires the em-
ployer to enter in his answer the disposable earnings of the employee for the 30-day period prior
to issuance of the order and notice of garnishment" 326 F. Supp. at 434 (emphasis supplied).
37 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
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to the Ohio formula is § 1673 of the CCPA,38 which provides that the
lesser of either (1) 25 percent of an employee's disposable earnings for
that week or (2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for
that week exceed 30 times the federal minimum hourly wage may be
withheld. This section also provides that for any pay period other than
a week the Secretary of Labor shall prescribe the applicable formulas."9
Another difference between the two laws is the protection they
afford a debtor's employment because of the garnishment process. The
CCPA provides that an employee may not be discharged because his
earnings have been subjected to garnishment to satisfy one creditor,"
while the Ohio Act provides that an employee may not be discharged
because his earnings have been subject to one action in garnishment
in any 12-month period.41  These two statutes also differ in that the
Ohio Act does not provide a criminal sanction for the improper dismissal
38 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1970).
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in section 1675 of
this title, the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for
any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed
(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week, or
(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty
times the Federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by section 20 6 (a) (1) of Title 29
in effect at the time the earnings are payable, whichever is less. In the case of earn-
ings for any pay period other than a week, the Secretary of Labor shall by regulation
prescribe a multiple of the Federal minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to that
set forth in paragraph (2).
(b) The restrictions of subsection (a) of this section do not apply in the case of
(1) any order of any court for the support of any person.
(2) any order of any court of bankruptcy under chapter XIII of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
(3) any debt due for any State or Federal tax.
(c) No court of the United States or any State may make, execute, or enforce
any order or process in violation of this section.
aa 29 C.F.R. § 870.10 (1971). The applicable portions of the Secretary's regulation in the
case of earnings for any period other than a week reads in part:
(1) The 25 percent part of the formula would apply to the aggregate disposable
earnings for all the workweeks compensated.
(2) The "multiple" of the Federal minimum hourly wage equivalent to that ap-
plicable to the disposable earnings for 1 week is represented by the following for-
mula: The number of workweeks, or fractions thereof (X) x 30 x the applicable Federal
minimum wage ($1.60). For the purpose of this formula, a calendar month is con-
sidered to consist of 4 1/3 workweeks. Thus, so long as the Federal minimum hourly
wage is $1.60 an hour, the "multiple" applicable to the disposable earnings for a 2-
week period is $96 (2 x 30 x $1.60); for a monthly period, $208 (4 1/3 x 30 x $1.60);
and for a semi-monthly period, $104 (2 1/6 x 30 x $1.60). The "multiple" for any
other pay period longer than I week shall be computed in a manner consistent with
section [1673(a)] of the [CCPA] and with this paragraph.
40 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1970).
(a) No employer may discharge any employee by reason of the fact that his earn-
ings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness.
4 1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.01 (L) (Page Supp. 1970). The last paragraph of
2715.01(L) reads:
No person shall discharge an employee solely by reason of such employee's per-
sonal earnings from such person having been attached through no more than one ac-
tion in garnishment in any twelve-month period.
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of an employee due to garnishment while the CCPA does so pro-
vide 42
The Ohio law provides no definition for the terms "earnings" or "per-
sonal earnings," other than that which can be gleaned from the rest of
the Act, while the CCPA provides such definitions.4 3 Because the federal
act includes public and private pension and retirement payments in its
definition of "personal earnings," and Ohio's law is silent on that point,
it may be inferred that the Ohio Act does not provide any garnishment
protection for these items. Another difference between the two acts is
that the Ohio law applies to Ohio residents only,44 while the federal
law applies to "all persons."
The differences which have been noted provide the substance of the
conflict between the CCPA and the Ohio Act. The forum which resolved
much of this conflict was the United States District Court in Hodgson v.
Cleveland Municipal Court.4 5
IV. THE HODGSON-CLEVELAND DECISION
In any conflict between a federal and a state law one of the initial
questions often requiring decision is the constitutionality of the federal
legislation. Because the constitutionality of Title III of the CCPA had
not been decided previously, Hodgson-Cleveland is the first opinion on
this issue. The court agreed with the declared congressional purpose,
and subsequently found Title III ". . . a constitutional and valid exer-
cise of congressional power."47  After deciding this initial matter the
court then addressed itself to the question of whether the Ohio Act
should stand or fall in whole or in part, to the mandates of the CCPA.
Section 1673 (c) of the CCPA provides: "No court of the United States or
any State may make, execute, or enforce any order or process in violation
42 15 U.S.C. § 1674(b) (1970).
43 15 U.S.C. § 1672 (1970).
For the purposes of this subchapter:
(a) The term "earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal ser-
vices, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and in-
cludes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program.
(b) The term "disposable earnings" means that part of the earnings of any individ-
ual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by
law to be withheld.
(c) The term "garnishment" means any legal or equitable procedure through
which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of any
debt.
4 4 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.62, 2329.66 (Page Supp. 1970). Section 2329.62 reads
in part: "Every person resident of the state, not included in section 2329.66...."
45 326 F. Supp. 419 (1971).
46 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (1970).
47 326 F. Supp. at 429.
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of this section."4 8  This question required a judicial construction of por-
tions of both the CCPA and the Ohio Act.
Those portions of the CCPA which required an interpretation were
§§ 1673, 1675, and 1677, which involved the question of whether
Congress chose the work week as the unit for computing exemptions from
garnishment and whether any state statute not using the week as the
computation unit was in violation of the CCPA. The court concluded
that Congress selected the week as the mandatory unit. Influential in
the court's reasoning process in arriving at this conclusion was the con-
gressional conference report quoted in the court's opinion 9 stating:
No garnishment is allowed which would exceed either 25 percent of dis-
posable earnings, or the amount by which the weekly disposable earnings
exceed 30 times the Federal minimum hourly wage, whichever is less.50
Because of this Congressional statement, the court concluded,
[t]his reference further reveals congressional intention to make mandatory
the legislated restrictions on garnishment. It is written into law. Section
1673(a) uses the phrase "may not exceed." Title V-General Provisions
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, Section 503 ... recites "grammati-
cal usages." In part, it states:
(3) The phrase "may not" is used to indicate that an action is both
unauthorized and forbidden.
In its last sentence, section 1673(a) orders the Secretary to prescribe by
regulation:
In the case of earnings for any pay period other than a week, * a
multiple of the Federal minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to
that set forth in paragraph (2).51
To arrive at its conclusion that Congress chose the week as the mandatory
computation unit, the court performed a judicial interpretation of the
CCPA which it does not explicitly state. This can be seen by consider-
ing §§ 1675 and the applicable part of 1677 set out consecutively here.
The Secretary of Labor may by regulation exempt from the provisions of
section 1673(a) of this title garnishments issued under the laws of any
State if he determines that the laws of that State provide restrictions on
garnishment which are substantially similar to those provided in section
1673(a) of this title.52
48 15 U.S.C. § 1673(c) (1970).
49326 F. Supp. at 430.
50 CONF. RaEp. No. 1397, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2029 (1968) (emphasis added).
51326 F. Supp. at 430. It should be noted that the court also gave judicial sanction to the
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Section 1673 (a), see note 39
supra. "The provisions of these regulations applicable to pay periods longer than one week
are declared and determined to conform to the language and intent of section 1673(a) and its
specified standards." 326 F. Supp. at 430.
5215 U.S.C. § 1675 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
1971]
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This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person
from complying with, the laws of any State
(1) prohibiting garnishments or providing for more limited garnish-
ment than are allowed under this subchapter.. ... 53
Section 1673 (a) states in part that "fejxcept as provided in subsection (b)
of this section and in section 1675 of this title, the maximum part of
the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek
which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed (1) 25 per centum
of his disposable earnings for that week. ... "54
The Hodgson-Cleveland court focused on the "may not exceed" lan-
guage of § 1673 (a) and not on the "except as provided in § 1675"
language. Consequently, the court implicitly assumed that for a state's
garnishment laws to be "substantially similar" to (the language of §
1675) or "more limited" than (the language of § 1677) the CCPA,
that state's laws must at least provide that no more than 25 percent of
any workweek's earnings can be garnished." With this implicit inter-
pretation a silent factor in its reasoning process, the court concluded:
. . . It is determined and declared that interlocked section 1673 (a) and
section 1673(c) federally forbid the making, execution, or enforcement of
any State court "order or process" that violates the restrictions on gar-
nishment contained in section 1673 (c) or any regulation of the Secretary
* . Likewise, the effect of any State garnishment law that underlies such
offending State court "order or process" is federally preempted.
Once having forbidden the validity of any State court "order or pro-
cess" that violates section 1673(a) it is unlikely that Congress in a later
provision of the same law would recant that prohibition. In any event,
the general language of section 1677 ... shows no Congressional intention
to abrogate or weaken the specific Federal preemption ordered by Con-
gress in section 1673(c).56
According to the Hodgson-Cleveland court those sections of the Ohio
law which required judicial interpretation to determine an employee's
allowable disposable earnings subject to garnishment were §§ 1911.332,
2329.62 and 2329.66. To make this determination it is necessary to
read the applicable portions of these three sections together. Sections
2329.62(C) and 2329.66(B) are similar 7 and provide for the exemp-
53 15 U.S.C. § 1677 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
54 Emphasis supplied.
55 This same result was reached by Robert D. Moran, Administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division, delegate of the Secretary of Labor, in denying Ohio's application for exemption on
November 24, 1970. In his deial he concluded ". . . the clear statement of Congress is [§ 1673J
addresses itself to restrictions on garnishment in terms of disposable earnings for any workweek
or other pay period .. ."
56 326 F. Supp. at 431-32.
57 OHO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.62(C) and 2329.66 (G) (Page Supp. 1970) are identical
with the exception that the former contains just the word "earnings" while the later contains
the words "personal earnings."
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tion of the greater of either (1) 82 percent of the employee's dispos-
able earnings for services rendered within 30 days or (2) one hundred
seventy-five times the minimum hourly wage. Therefore, it is these
two sections which, in the converse, determine the amount of a debtor's
earnings which are subject to garnishment (17 percent) under §
1911.332. The court concluded that the implementing provision of §
1911.332 when properly construed,
... requires an employer to withhold for the payment of an employee'sjudgment debt and to pay into court a portion of an employee's dispos-
able earnings for that week that represent 17V2 percent of the em-
ployee's total earnings for the previous 30 days.58
After construing both the state and federal laws the court met the
preemption issue of whether § 1911.332 ". . . require[s] an Ohio court to
violate 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (a) (1970) and its maximum of 25 percent
of an employee's disposable earnings for that week?"5 9  The court an-
swered this inquiry by concluding ". . . that the express preemption of
sections 1673 (a) and (c) directly applies to garnishments of the dis-
posable earnings of Ohio employees paid on a weekly, bi-weeldy, or
semi-monthly basis."' Continuing, the court specifically held that:
Upon the entire record and in accordance with the determinations and
declarations heretofore made, it is specifically determined and declared
that Ohio Rev. Code § 1911.332 (1970) as to lines 4, 5, and 6 of Section
58 326 F. Supp. at 434. In its earlier interlocutory memorandum and order, at page 9,
James D. Hodgson, Secretary of Labor v. Cleveland Municipal Court, Civil Action No. C. 70-
908 (N.D. Ohio September 25, 1970), the court arrived at a different construction of the Ohio
law.
.. . mT3hose disposable earnings that shall be subject to garnishment shall refer
to actual earnings due and owing an employee at the time of garnishment (emphasis
supplied).
The court initially construed the Ohio law in this manner to avoid an equal protection problem
presented by the parenthetical language found in line (4) of section B of the form found in §
1911.332, which suggests that an employee who has not worked a full 30 days may be garnished
as though he had. However, while eliminating this equal protection problem by referring to
actual earnings (the use of the words disposable earnings accomplishes the same idea), this Sep-
tember 25, 1970 construction, by referring to earnings due and owing, created a conflict between
the exemption standards of §§ 2329.62(C) and 2329.66(G) (exempting 82V2 percent of an
employee's earnings from garnishment) and § 1911.332 which was structured (in a converse
manner) to implement those exemption standards.
This conflict may be illustrated by the following example. An employee who has earned$430.00 during the prior 30 days and is paid $100.00 weekly, would have 17 2 percent of his$100.00 pay check garnished. This would mean that over 95 percent of his prior 30 day earnings(only one garnishment is permitted every 30 days) would be exempt from garnishment - a
greater exemption than allowed by §§ 2329.62(C) and 2329.66(G).
To preserve the exemption standards of §§ 2329.62(C) and 2329.66(G), while still avoiding
the equal protection problem, the court overturned its September 25, 1970 construction of the
Ohio Act to the extent that it replaced the language "due and owing an employee at the time
of garnishment" with the language "the employee's total earnings for the previous 30 days,"
while maintaining the notion that only actual earnings (through the continued use of the words
"disposable earnings") could be garnished.
59 326 F. Supp. at 434.
GOId. at 435.
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B, "Answer of Employer (Garnishee)," Ohio Rev. Code § 2715.112
(1970), insofar as it incorporates Ohio Rev. Code § 1911.332 (1970)
and lines 2, 3, and 4 of "Payment to Avoid Garnishment" of Ohio Rev.
Code § 2715.02 (1970), are expressly preempted by 15 U.S.C. §§ 1673
(a) and (c) (1970).61
To illustrate why §§ 1673(a) and (c) of the CCPA preempted §
1911.332 of the Ohio law, the differing effects of the state and federal
formulas are demonstrated. Under the Ohio provisions as written, a
worker paid $430.00 once a month"2 would have $75.25 withheld from
his earnings by garnishment, while under the CCPA this same worker
would have $107.50 withheld. The effects of the Ohio procedure are
obvious when considering a monthly paid worker. However, consider
the worker paid once a week. Under Ohio's formula, which allows
only one garnishment every 30 days, a worker paid $100.00 once a week
would have $72.25 withheld, while under the CCPA this same worker
would have only $25.00 withheld.63  The differing effects upon the weekly
paid worker frame the main point of conflict between the federal and Ohio
law.
By preempting only those Ohio sections relating to weekly and semi-
monthly paid employees, the Ohio provision concerning monthly paid
debtors would have been left intact. To provide uniformity in applica-
tion for all pay periods the court imposed the same federal 25 percent
garnishment standard to monthly paid employees." As a result, the
implementing provisions of § 1911.3325 for garnishing an employee's
61 Id. at 437.
62 Assume, as did the Secretary of Labor, see note 39 supra, that a calendar month consists
of 4 1/3 workweeks. Also assume in this example and all following ones that all necessary de-
ductions required by law have been made, and that what the worker is paid represents what is
left after the deductions have been made.
6 3 A complete example of how the various formulas operate is illustrated by the use of
a table presented here.
CCPA Ohio's Act
Lesser of Lesser of
Pay Periods (§ 1673) 1 30 (§ 1911.332) 175
and Amounts or or
times times
Earned 25% S 1.60 17 % 1.60
Monthly
$430 $107.50 $208.00 S75.25 S280.00
Semi-monthly
$215 S 53.75 S 96.00 S75.25 $280.00
Weekly
SIN0 S 25.00 S 48.00 S75.25 $280.00
64 326 F. Supp. at 436.
65 OiHo REV. CoDE ANN. § 1911.332 (Page Supp. 1970). Lines 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Section
B, see note 29 supra.
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wages were replaced by court promulgated provisions." These replace-
ment provisions, inserted into the mechanical process for garnishing earn-
ings in Ohio, left the state with a functionable garnishment law. In-
cluded in this judicially reconstructed law was the original Ohio Act's
feature permitting only one garnishment every 30 days."
V. CONCLUSION
The court's rehabilitation of the Ohio Act, although extensive, was
not complete. Several questions remain unanswered.
6 326 F. Supp. at 438-39.
3. Enter on line 3 all disposable earnings defined in Section 302(b), CCPA (15
U.S.C., § 1672(b) (1968) and Ohio Revised Code § 2329.621 (1970) payable, or
accrued, to the defendant (employee) for any pay period at the time of your receipt
of this Order and Notice of Garnishment. If disposable earnings are payable, or
accrued, for more than one pay period, make a separate entry for each pay period
showing the amount of disposable earnings and the time periods that these amounts
represent.
$
Present pay Time period
period involved
$ -----
Previous pay Time period
period involved
4. Enter on line below the smaller: 25% of whatever amount or amounts have
been entered on line 3, or the difference between each amount on line 3 the following
computations:
$48 if the time involved is 1 week or less.
$68.38 if the time involved is greater than 1 week of a 10-day pay period.
$96 if the time involved is greater than 1 week of a bi-weekly pay period.
$104 if the time involved is greater than 2 weeks of a semi-monthly pay period.
$208 if the time involved is greater than V month of a monthly pay period.
$ $---------
Present pay Previous pay
period period
5. Extend to line 5 the total of the entries made on line 4. Pay said total
amount into court when returning this form. However, in no event shall the amount
paid into Court exceed the amount on line C of Section A of this form.
$--------
I certify that the statements above are true.
Print name of Print name and title of person
employer who completed form
Dated this ---- day of ----------- , 19----.
Signature of person
completing form
67 326 F. Supp. at 436. It was argued by the defendants that because the court declared
that garnishment was to be computed based on the unit of a work week and not the unit of a
30-day period, the court should also declare that the number of permissible garnishments
should be based on the unit of a work week. The court rejected this argument because it
misconceives the extent of this court's power of preemption." 326 F. Supp. at 436.
The court defined its power of preemption based on Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm.
v. Continental Air Lines, Inc, 372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963):
To hold that a state statute identical in purpose with a federal statute is invalid under
the Supremacy Clause, we must be able to conclude that the purpose of the federal
statute would to some extent be frustrated by the state statute.
In rejecting the defendant's argument, the court declared, "It is plain that enforcement of
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Among these questions is the potential for an equal protection"8
problem. Because the Ohio law as interpreted in Hodgson-Cleveland
still permits only one garnishment every 30 days, employees who re-
ceive the same monthly earnings but have differing pay periods will have
different amounts garnished from their monthly earnings. For example,
the employee who is paid $100.00 once a week ($430.00 per month)"'
under the court-imposed formula will have $25.00 dollars garnished from
his monthly earnings, while the employee who is paid $430.00 once a
month will have $97.50 garnished from his monthly earnings.70  Obviously
this presents an inequitable situation which discriminates against the
debtor who is paid once a month. It is difficult to discern any rational
basis for this result. When the Ohio legislature enacted Amended Substi-
tute Senate Bill No. 85, it had a rational basis for its particular legislative
scheme-a 30-day pay period. When Congress enacted the CCPA it also
had a rational basis for its particular legislative scheme-the work week.
However, in attempting to integrate the two legislative schemes the Hogd-
son-Cleveland court arrived at an apparent irrational result. To remedy
this inequity the court could have reconstructed the Ohio law to permit one
garnishment every pay period. However, to do this the court would have
been forced to ignore its conception of the doctrine of preemption.71
A second area which demands scrutiny is the court's holding that
*. it is specifically determined and declared that ...lines 2, 3, and 4
of 'Payment to Avoid Garnishment' of Ohio Rev. Code § 2715.02 (1970),
are expressly preempted by 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) and (c) (1970) ."72
Why was the court so concerned with § 2715.027? That portion of
the Ohio law which determined how much, in fact, would be garnished
from an employee's earnings was § 1911.332 not § 2715.02. 71 Section
the Federal garnishment law, silent on the subject of frequency of garnishments, is not 'frustrated'
by the Ohio limitation of one garnishment a month." 326 F. Supp. at 436.
68 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
69 Supra note 62.
70 This same effect occurs in the instances of those employees whose pay periods are longer
than a week but shorter than a month.
71 An interesting question, ancillary to the scope of this note, is: Why did this federal court,
after striking lines 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Section B of the form contained in OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1911.332, then promulgate its own forms? The supremacy of the federal law is not doubted,
but does not the federal court's task halt with striking down the conflicting state law when there
is no federal law to replace it? The CCPA sets only standards for garnishment, it does not devise
procedures to implement those standards. Since OI-o REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.62(C) and
2329.66(G) represent the exemption standards which OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1911.332
implements in the converse, it must be implicitly assumed (because the court was silent), these
sections no longer stand as originally written. If this is so, the court, while employing its own
version of judicial architecture, should have finished its work by either replacing the old exemp-
tion standards with its own, or by stating that the converse of what it prescribed for § 1911.332
is the new §§ 2329.62(C) and 2329.66(G).
72 326 F. Supp. at 437.
73 See note 21 supra.
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2715.02 provides for a voluntary procedure to avoid all effects of the
involuntary procedure of § 1911.332.
A f rther question resulting from the Hogdson-Cleveland decision
concerns the last paragraph of § 2715.01"' and § 1674(a) 75 of the
CCPA. The court quotes these two sections and determines that the
record before it ". . . discloses no justiciable controversy . . . - How-
ever, the effect of the language of the two sections is not similar and
does present a conflict. The CCPA provides that an employee may
not be discharged because his earnings ". . . have been subjected to gar-
nishment for any one indebtedness[,]"77 while the Ohio Act provides
that an employee may not be discharged because his earnings have been
subjected to ". . . no more than one action in garnishment in any
twelve-month period."78  The first dissimilarity is that § 1674(a) pro-
vides for no time restriction while the Ohio law does. The significant
difference, however, is that under the Ohio provision an employee may
be discharged upon the second action in garnishment on one indebted-
ness in any 12-month period. Comparatively, under § 1674(a) an em-
ployee may not be discharged upon the second action in garnishment on
one indebtedness. This conflict could easily be reconciled by judicial in-
terpretation under the authority of the legislative intent clause found in
the Ohio Act.
One minor question left by the court in its opinion remains unre-
solved. This question relates to the language in the first sentence of §
2329.62, which states, "[elvery person resident of the state.... ." Arguably
this language could exclude from the restrictions upon the amount of earn-
ings which may be garnished, a non-resident of the state who was employed
and paid in the state. Again this minor matter could easily be corrected
by judicial construction pursuant to the legislative intent clause found in
the Ohio Act.""
As a result of Hodgson-Cleveland, Ohio's legislative attempt to es-
cape the super-imposition of federal law failed in large measure.8 Ohio.
74 See note 41 rupra.
7 See note 40 supra.
76 326 F. Supp. at 437.
77 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
78 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.01 (L) (Page Supp. 1970) (emphasis supplied).
7 0 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3239.621 (Page Supp. 1970).
soId.
81 Hodgson v. Cleveland Municipal Court, 326 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio 1971), is being
followed by state courts in Ohio's northern district, but by few state courts in the southern district.
To bring the entire state in line with federal standards, the Secretary of Labor has brought
suit in the southern district seeking a permanent injunction against the Hamilton County Munic-
ipal Court to halt its use of a garnishment process similar to that in the original Ohio Act. The
Secretary has been successful in securing a preliminary injunction, James D. Hodgson, Secretary
of Labor v. Hamilton County Municipal Court, Civil Action No. 7954 (S.D. Ohio September
23, 1971), and it is assumed he will be successful in securing a permanent injunction.
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is now left with a hybrid garnishment process generally more restric-
tive than the original Ohio Act. Whether the General Assembly will
accept this hybrid garnishment process or again attempt to revise the
Ohio law remains to be seen.
Thomas S. Moore
Richard Pfeiffer
